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ABSTRACT
Few social arrangements have affected so many people for so long in human
history, as the laws and customs governing the ownership and use of land.
Taking Romania as a case study, this thesis focuses on the institutional changes
that accompany land reform (e.g., property rights, market services, rural financial
services) and the role the state plays in the implementation process. The main
hypothesis is that in developing countries, unsatisfactory forms of agrarian
structure, and in particular the systems of land tenure, tend in a variety of ways to
impede economic development.
The results of this study illustrate that in Romania improper implementation of
land reform had negative effects on development - further deterioration in the
standard of living for the rural population, decline in real productivity, and lower
production. Hence, one main conclusion is that the distribution of property rights
in land is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for creating the basis for
development. Redistribution of property rights in land has to be complemented
with technical advice and more integrated cross-sector policies such as easy
access to credit and agricultural inputs, production and social infrastructure.
State involvement is crucial for supporting these services.
Thesis Supervisor: Alice Amsden
Title: Barton L Weller Professor of Political Economy
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction
Few social arrangements have affected so many people for so long in
human history, as the laws and customs governing the ownership and use of
land. In a typical developing country, agriculture provides the largest source not
only of income but also of employment. Hence, in the countries where land is a
major asset for people and the product of land accounts for a significant share in
the national income, land reform becomes an important issue. Generally, land
reform refers to "the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of
the landless, tenants, and farm laborers" (Warriner, 1969). Often in the
academic literature, the terms "land reform" and "agrarian reform" are used
interchangeably. Adams (1995) argues that agrarian reform, a construct of the
Cold War to counter "communist" land reform, embraces improvements in both
land tenure and agricultural organization. Agrarian reform includes both the
conditions for land tenure (like ownership, lease, etc.), known as reform of land
ownership, and those aspects of land use (like farm size, supporting institutions,
etc.) called land management reform (Kuhnen 1982). In this study, for
convenience, I will use the concept of land reform in its broader context of the
agricultural reform, hence including the institutional changes related to land
tenure, agricultural production, and commercialization.
Three major historical circumstances induce the establishment of land
reform: revolutionary pressure, democratic change, and military force. In
Romania, the 1990s land reform was implemented in the attempt to establish a
democratic society by overthrowing the communist rule, and putting into place
market-oriented institutions.
However, due to controversial agricultural policies as well as industrial
policies, the initial goals of land reform were not achieved. It was proved that the
macroeconomic environment was not supportive of the land reform. Due to the
social pressures created by land restitution, the power of the rural elite was the
driving force for land reform. Hence, the social pressure for an immediate
change (leaving no time for consolidating the reform), coupled with tremendous
institutional and financial constraints faced by the government, led to poor
outcomes from land reform. To judge the value of land reform from an economic
point of view one has to look both at the immediate effect on the value of the
peasants' standard of living as well as the long-term effect on the productivity
and growth potential of the economy.
According to these criteria in Romania, land reform resulted in a stronger
deterioration in the level of living for the rural population, decline in real
productivity, lower production, and overall negative contribution to the growth
potential of the economy.
Hence, there are a few key conclusions that one can draw from this case.
First, policymakers need to transfer the issue of land reform from the political
arena to the economics and market context. Second, land redistribution and
fragmentation, while necessary, it is not sufficient. It has to be complemented
with technical advice and more integrated, cross-sector policies (such as
production and social infrastructure, agro-economic land zoning, computerized
property register, police and judiciary reform). Third, the much-talked about
family farming cannot thrive by itself (especially within a supportive institutional
setting) but has to be integrated within some collective experiences. Fourth, the
short-term goals need to be replaced by long term planning. Creating conditions
for long term planning would involve land taxation, land transactions, and
adequate land valuation.
1.2 Research Question
This thesis questions whether land reform is to be considered a crucial
policy for attaining sustainable economic development in countries where
agriculture provides the livelihood for a significant share of the population. I will
take Romania as a case study. It is important to mention that although the
countries in Central and Eastern European (CEE) region were functioning 15
years ago under the same economic system, the experience of transition to a
market economy was quite different. Therefore, one should not generalize from
the Romanian case.
The focus of this thesis will be on the institutional changes that
accompany the land reform (e.g., property rights, market services, rural financial
services) and the role the state plays in the implementation process. The main
hypothesis is that in developing countries, unsatisfactory forms of agrarian
structure, and in particular the systems of land tenure, tend in a variety of ways to
impede economic development. I intend to answer the following questions with
respect to Romania: Is the distribution of property rights sufficient for achieving
equal distribution of incomes and hence paving the way to development? Should
agriculture function on the market forces mechanism? Additionally, I intend to
draw some lessons from other countries that experienced 'successful'" land
reforms, with positive outcomes for the overall economic development (for
example, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, China and Japan).
1.3 Thesis structure
Chapter 1 will present the research question and the methodology.
Chapter 2 will continue with a brief literature review on the role of land reform in
economic development. This section will cover the key debates in the field of
development on the aspects of land reform, in countries where the agricultural
resources are important assets for the livelihood of the people. Additionally I will
go over the main theoretical aspects of property rights in land, as well as ways to
promote collective action.
11 will define later in the study what I mean by "successful" in the case of land reform in
transitional economies.
To understand the importance of land reform in transition countries, one
needs to understand the common structure of the socialist agriculture that
dominated these countries for decades. Hence, in chapter 3 I will provide a
background description of the common heritage in former socialist countries -
centrally planned agriculture with a sharply dualistic structure based on very
large commercially oriented collective farms and very small subsistence oriented
household plots. This chapter sets the stage for introducing the discussion on
the agricultural transition in Romania, in the context of the overall reform
programs. By doing this, I intend to present a critical analysis of the land reform
from its social, economic as well as institutional perspectives.
Nevertheless, because learning from past experiences and from other
countries can teach us important lessons, in chapter 4 I will provide a separate
section of lessons to be learned from 'successful' land reforms implemented in
other countries.
The study will conclude by suggesting a few policy alternatives for the
current state of the Romanian land reform process, as well as opening up the
way to further research on particular aspects that were outside the scope of this
thesis.
1.4 Methodology
The empirical support of this thesis consists of secondary statistics
provided by different statistical offices. Most of the data are obtained from the
National Statistical Office for Romania, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
and United Nations. The statistical methods revolve around the descriptive
analysis techniques. The main variables under study relate to records on land
redistribution, incomes, agricultural output, productivity, technical endowment,
and land prices.
The major challenge for studying the agricultural sector is finding an
accurate measurement for the contribution of land reform to economic
development. Because development is the result of a continuous interaction and
coordination between all the economic sectors, and due to data limitations2 in this
sector, coming up with an instrument or a set of instruments becomes
problematic. Koo (1968) claims that, for example, a generalized incentive effect,
if it should prevail, is an extremely important step in fostering economic
development but it is not subject to quantitative measurement. Instead, we could
examine the flow of funds from agricultural to the nonagricultural sectors and the
size of out-migration from farm as proxy variables of such changes in attitudes in
the farming communities.
2 In April 2004 the National Institute of Statistics in collaboration with the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry from Romania, and Ministry of Agricultural Policies and ISTAT
from Italy, finalized the PHARE project entitled "Synchronization of the Romanian
agricultural statistics with the European System's standards. This project will hopefully
contribute to gathering more detailed and comprehensive data at national and regional
While this indicator is very appealing for my purposes, more research is
necessary to obtain adequate and detailed statistics. Therefore, the main
indicators I will use in my analysis will focus on labor productivity, output,
incomes, labor migration, employment, and foreign trade in agricultural products.
Employment is an important indicator for assessing social and economic
sustainability in agriculture, but its statistical accuracy is heavily impeded.
Therefore, its use becomes less reliable, especially in the case of agricultural
sector. First, subsistence agriculture (as in the case of Romania) is mainly based
on self-employment with no contracts (informal labor). Therefore, a large part of
the active population in the rural areas never had a contract-based job and hence
they are not recorded in the employment statistics. This leads to underestimation
of the unemployment records since these people are not registered as jobless
either, and in addition are not eligible for unemployment benefits. Hence, the
evaluation of the labor market in agriculture should be made with caution
because it hosts a large number of informal laborers.
The same is true of statistics related to incomes in rural areas. The data
on earned incomes from agriculture are very vague because of the
predominance of informal labor. Additionally, the traditional market for agricultural
products in the rural areas leaves revenues from working the land unaccounted.
Therefore, it is important to be aware that the unemployment statistics for the
traditional sector tend to be underestimated, as well as the data on earned
incomes.
level, compatible with the international statistics.(http://financiar.rol.ro/stiri/2004/04/135428.htm)
Since it is beyond the scope of this study to develop more accurate
statistics, I will still use the existing indicators. However, it is very important to be
aware that the published data for unemployment are underestimated and hence
the poverty rate too.
CHAPTER 2
Literature review
2.1 The role of land reform in economic development
Ever since at least the time of Ricardo, the theory of development had
emphasized that agricultural progress contributes to the support of greater
productivity throughout the economy. Greater agricultural productivity and output
can contribute to an economy's development in the following ways: (1) by
supplying foodstuffs and raw materials to other sectors in the economy; (2) by
providing surplus of savings and taxes to support investment in agriculture and
other sectors; (3) by selling for cash a 'marketable surplus' that will raise the
demand for other products; (4) by relaxing the foreign exchange constraint by
earning foreign exchange though exports or by saving foreign exchange through
import substitution (Meier, 1995).
Additionally, one must view agriculture not merely as a source of
surpluses to support industrialization, but also as a dynamic source of growth,
employment, and better distribution of income. The lack of agricultural progress
will cut short the industrial development - unless the economy is in the
exceptional situation of being able to export manufactures for imports of
foodstuffs and raw materials, which is not the case for most developing countries.
In these countries (among which Romania, too), agriculture is the main source of
livelihood for its inhabitants having a long-established tradition in its economy.
Generally, these countries are in their initial phases of industrialization and hence
other sectors are not self-sufficient or able to generate enough surplus.
Riad el Ghonemy (1975) claims that in developing countries with defective
agrarian structure, sustained economic development over a long period of time is
not possible without substantial changes in the institutional structure in
agriculture and without adequate emphasis on the welfare aspects of
development. More importantly, such a transformation needs to ensure that the
positive outcomes are effectively reaching other sectors as well (primarily,
industry). Consequently, when discussing economic development, it is common
to include a reference to the desirability of land reform, which lays the foundation
for achieving this end.
The concept of land reform covers a set of measures designed to reform
land tenure structure and related production and supporting services structures
not only to eliminate obstacles to economic development but also to accelerate
the process of development.
However, the ways and extent to which land reform will affect
development are seldom researched and translated in empirically identifiable
terms. One reason for the lack of these studies is perhaps that land reform has
the nature of an innovation in the social order. It changes the organizational and
structural framework within which economic activities occur, whereas existing
economic theories usually assume that the institutional framework is to be held
stable so that analyses can be reduced to manageable proportions. Another
reason for the difficulty in examining the changes which are likely to be brought
forth by land reform in its functional and causal relationship with the process of
development is that the growth models used by economists are often limited to
mathematical models which exclude social organization, welfare aspects related
to income redistribution and institutional forces (Lin, 1975).
Recognition of institutional reform as an important variable for economic
development has been relatively slow in coming (Dovring, 1974). Even though
countries in East Asia experienced significant growth as a result of land reform,
only in early June 1970 was its importance brought to international attention
through the conference on land reform held in Washington D.C., as a 'Spring
Review' by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Such a shift in
opinions reflects advances in comprehensive economic analysis relating to
increased understanding of macro-economic relations such as rates of return to
resources in social accounts, inter-sectoral linkages, and economic
consequences stemming indirectly from the socio-political effects of institutional
change.
The objectives of land reform have been generally recognized as being
principally social and political. It was long and widely believed that such
objectives were in conflict with the requirements of economic development.
(Dovring, 1974). These political and social objectives have been variously listed
as improving distributive justice, reducing concentration of economic and political
power, increasing political participation, enhancing social stability, and
redesigning social power structures. The difficulty resided in reconciling these
aims with those of maximizing production and the rate of growth in production.
One outcome of land reform is income redistribution and increases in
individual welfare. Koo (1968) argues that land reform has the beneficial effect of
creating institutional preconditions for economic development through the
elimination of political and social tensions, which discourage long-term
investment. The equal distribution of property rights for land creates a more
egalitarian society and reduces social unrest. In addition, it ensures a way to
achieve improved welfare and accumulation of surplus. The rapid growth of farm
incomes and purchasing power among a broad range of farmers contributes to
an increased demand impetus for industrialization efforts.
However, a redistribution of land may be a necessary but not a sufficient
consideration for increasing output; it is conceivable that under certain
circumstances it may even lead to a fall in output. First, redistributing land to the
landless laborers, many of whom may have not been engaged for years in
farming operations and may have lost skills in cultivation, is likely to lead to less
efficient cultivation. Second, transferring land to small farmers may also have
adverse effects on output, if small farmers do not have access to agricultural
inputs or financial resources. However, it is to be expected that a more equitable
distribution of inputs, marketing opportunities, and credit facilities would be
facilitated by a more equitable and egalitarian distribution of land, which is the
main source of economic power in the rural areas. To the above, Dovring (1974)
adds co-operation/collective action as another institutional change that can be
enhanced through land reform. He argues that in order for co-operation to
succeed, the rural community should have a certain degree of distributive equity.
However, as we will see later in the study, co-operation does not come by itself
once land resources are distributed equally between users.
Another outcome of land reform is the disposition of funds acquired by the
landowners after they sold their land (Koo, 1968). For instance, investment of
such funds in industrial and urban development can foster industrialization.
However, since land reform measures are part of the general economic and
social policies of the government, the achievements cannot be fully attributable to
land reform but are contingent upon the decisions taken on other economic and
social policies.
A third and more important effect of the land reform is setting up an
institutional and organizational structure for a sustainable development process.
A carryover of this structure to other sectors and segments of the society is
possibly the most significant long-term effect of land reform, establishing the
preconditions for industrialization (Amsden, 1985, 1989). The institution of
property rights has the primary role, as well as entrepreneurial initiatives
stimulated by collective organizational behavior.
Discussions around the relationship between economies of scale, size of
land holdings, and increased productivity are common in this area. The critique of
socialist agriculture is mainly focused on the "excessively large" land holdings
lacking efficiency and over-employing workers, and emphasizing quantity rather
than quality requirements for the products. Hence, proponents of the market-
oriented economy emphasize small-scale farming for enhancing productivity and
boosting profits.
2.2 The importance of property rights in land
In transitional economies, as well as in other developing countries,
property rights are the most essential institutional arrangements creating the
framework for a capitalist, market-based economy. In order to consider the role
of property rights in general and land rights in particular, it is important to place
these rights in the context of the overall institutional structure of the society and
economy (Feder and Feeny, 1991).3
Property rights are an important class of institutional arrangements.4 In
general, "property as a social institution implies a system of relations between
individuals... .it involves rights, duties, powers, privileges, forbearance, etc., of
certain kinds" (Hallowell, 1943).
The existence of well-defined property rights seems an absolutely
essential precondition for the proper functioning of a market economy. Well-
defined property rights typically include the following elements: to every property
3 There are three basic categories of institutions: constitutional order, institutional
arrangements, and normative behavioral codes. The constitutional order refers to the
fundamental rules about how society is organized - the rules for making rules.
Institutional arrangements are created within the rules specified by the constitutional
order. These arrangements include laws, regulations, associations, contracts, and
property rights in land. The third category, normative behavioral codes, refers to the
cultural values which legitimize the arrangements and constrain behavior. The
constitutional order and normative behavioral codes evolve slowly; the institutional
arrangements may be more readily modified (Feder and Feeny, 1991: 136).
is assigned a 'well-defined owner(s)' with exclusive rights of ownership; to the
owner of property goes the residual income accruing to the assets; the owner
has the right to control or determine use of the existing assets, to restructure the
property, and to sell or lease it. From the "theory of the firm" point of view (to be
discussed more later), without well defined private ownership the firm will tend to
operate badly. Similarly, I argue that any system without widespread well-defined
property rights will tend to perform badly.
In the transitional economies literature, the issue of clearly defined
property rights is related to the "soft budget" concept - since there are no clearly
identified owners to pay for mistakes or bad luck, someone else pays, typically
the state. When true property owners or residual claimants exist, it is ultimately
they who are uniquely positioned, by having the rights and the incentives, to
observe or to monitor input behavior; to negotiate and to enforce contracts on
behalf of the firm; to hire and lay off workers; to sell off or buy property; and to
take other decisions to increase the profitability of the firm. It is they who
ultimately must pay for the mistakes or bad luck (Weitzman and Xu, 1993).
To understand land reform, we need to grasp the links between the
institutions of property rights in land, power, and the authority of the State (Riad
EI-Ghonemy, 1990). In the case of land, when analysts refer to the necessity of
developing property rights, they mean to divide the land into separate parcels
and assign individual rights to hold, use, and transfer these parcels as individual
4 Institutional arrangements include the mechanisms for defining and enforcing property
rights; that is, they include both the formal procedures and the social customs and
attitudes concerning the legitimacy and recognition of those rights (Taylor 1988).
owners desire (subject to the general regulations of a jurisdiction regarding the
use and transfer of land).
The institution of property rights is at the heart of the land tenure system.
In the Western system of thought and historical tradition, the institution of private
property rights is a foundation of capitalism and is considered to be essential to
democracy (Riad EI-Ghonemy, 1990). Having property title reduces private
enforcement costs, provides security and collateral for long-term investment in
land improvements, and promotes development of land markets. All these
activities are wealth-enhancing (Alston et al., 1996).
The scope and content of property rights assignments over resources
affect the way that people behave in a world of scarcity (Eurubotn and Pejovich,
1974). The volumes of goods that can be exchanged and their terms of trade
must depend on the bundles of rights that can be transferred legally.
One set of advocates presumes that a central authority must assume
continuing responsibility to make unitary decisions for a particular resource.
Others presume that a central authority should parcel out ownership rights to the
resource and then allow individuals to pursue their own self-interests within well-
defined property rights.
Getting the institutions right is a time consuming, conflict invoking process.
It is a process that requires reliable information about time and place variables as
well as a broad repertoire of culturally acceptable rules. New institutional
arrangements do not work in practice as they do in abstract models unless the
models are well specified and empirically valid and the participants in the field
setting understand how to make the new rules work.
Ostrom (1986) defines institutions as sets of working rules used to
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some areas, what actions are
allowed or constrained, what procedures must be followed, what information
must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals
depending on their actions.
2.2.1 Property rights and incentives
Property rights provide the owners incentives to use land efficiently and to
invest in land conservation and improvement. The way property rights are
implemented induces or inhibits investment in improving productivity of the
physical content of property (e.g., irrigation and soil improvement by applying
fertilizers).
2.2.2 Property rights and asymmetric information
With more advanced stages of development and increased mobility of
individuals and entrepreneurs, transactions among individuals who are not
members of the same community become more frequent. As a result, the scope
of asymmetric information, and hence land disputes, increases. The price of land
will therefore not reflect the true value, and the extent of land transactions will be
less than optimal.
Feder and Feeny (1991: 144) provide a clear explanation for the relation
between land prices, property-rights, and land transactions. Accordingly, land
prices cannot remain unaffected by increases in the risk of land loss, because as
farmers reduce their demand for the fixed supply of land, an excess supply is
created which drives down the equilibrium price. Land prices are thus shown to
be inversely related to the degree of risk associated with land rights. The
reduction in land values with increased risk diminishes further the supply of credit
per unit of land.
2.2.3 Property riqhts and land markets
Land transactions generally increase the efficiency of resource allocation,
as agents with high marginal productivity of land are induced to acquire land from
agents with low marginal productivity. A functioning legal system and effective
enforcement mechanisms are necessary as well for reducing information
asymmetries.
2.2.4 Property rights and access to credit
The use of collateral on loans reduces uncertainty and moral hazard
problems for creditors. Collateral is more valuable the more immobile and
immune to damage it is, and land has traditionally been an ideal collateral asset
in areas where land is scarce (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986).
Land's usefulness as collateral is dependent on the absence of uncertainty
and asymmetric information with regard to the rights (in particular transfer rights)
of the owner. The lender, for the same reasons, would like to be assures that the
borrower has indeed the privilege to dispose of the land by sale or transfer of the
use rights. Hence, the availability of land as collateral, and documentation of land
rights which make such collateral credible, affect the willingness of creditors to
give loans. It follows that the same institutional arrangements that increase
incentives for productive use of land also facilitate a more efficient credit market.
2.2.5 Property riqhts and public resources
In the rural areas of many developing countries the institutional
arrangements necessary to provide incentives and reduce uncertainty and
asymmetric information are often not well developed or are largely absent. This is
mainly due to the inadequacy of public resources leading to low land security.
The administration dealing with land records may suffer from deficient technology
(for example handwritten record retrieval methods when microcomputers would
be much more efficient), insufficient labor resources, and inappropriate storage
facilities. The judicial and policy systems may be understaffed and underpaid,
which creates conditions for rent-seeking and for a slow process of property
rights enforcement.
In some countries, the legal apparatus defining property rights may be
excessively complex and may require various type of documents and affidavits
which may be useful in an urban context but not in an agricultural context. The
complexities increase the transaction costs associated with enhancing the
security of property rights (for instance, requiring the experience of expensive
lawyers and demanding substantial time inputs from the farmers). This may
create a stratification whereby wealthier and larger farmers find it easier and
more worthwhile to finance these transaction costs (which tend to be relatively
size-invariant), whereas smaller and poorer farmers would not undertake them.
The inadequacy of public sector resources for reducing uncertainty in
property rights is aggravated by a public institutional framework that makes it
difficult or impossible for private sector agents to substitute, if only in part, for the
lack of public infrastructure.
2.3 Collective action
Previous policy experiences from other countries reveal that the
distribution of property rights to land users and the transition to family farming is
not sufficient for promoting development. Incorporating experiences of collective
action is essential for a sustainable land reform, and securing future returns
though efficient investments.
The neo-classical economic theory is based on an institutional regime of
private property in which all goods and services are privately (individually) utilized
or consumed. Only recently have serious attempts been made to extend the
formal theoretical structure to include communal or collective ownership-
consumption arrangements (Buchanan, 1965). Buchanan developed the theory
of clubs, whose central question is that of determining the membership margin,
the size of the most desirable cost and consumption sharing arrangement. An
economic theory of clubs can strictly apply only to the extent that the motivation
for joining in sharing arrangements is itself economic; that is only if choices are
made on the basis of costs and benefits of particular goods and services as
these are confronted by the individual. The theory assumes that for any good and
service, regardless of its ultimate place along the conceptual public-private
spectrum, the utility that an individual receives from its consumption depends
upon the number of other persons with whom he must share the benefits.
Organizing appropriators for collective action regarding a common
property resource (CPR), like land, is usually an uncertain and complex
undertaking. Uncertainty has many external sources: the quantity and timing of
rainfall, the temperature and amount of sunlight, the presence or absence of
disease-bearing vectors, and so on. However, the most important one and the
one that can be brought under control is the market prices of various inputs and
final products (Ostrom, 1990). Other sources of uncertainty are internal to CPR
and the appropriators using the CPR, such as the lack of knowledge (or
asymmetric information). The exact structure of the resource system itself - its
boundaries and internal characteristics - must be established.
Collective action problems related to the provision of CPRs and
appropriation from CPRs extend over time. Individuals attribute less value to
benefits that they expect to receive in the distant future, and more value to those
expected in the immediate future. In other words, individuals discount future
benefits. Additionally, each individual must take into account the choices of
others when assessing personal choices - "...when a number of individuals have
a common or collective interest - when they share a single purpose or objective
- individual, unorganized action [either will] not be able to advance that common
interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest adequately" (Olson
1965, p.7).
At the most general level, the problem facing CPR appropriators is one of
organizing: how to change the situation from one in which appropriators act
independently to one in which they adopt coordinated strategies to obtain higher
joint benefits or reduce their joint harm. Organizing is a process; an organization
is the result of that process. An organization of individuals who constitute an
ongoing enterprise is only one form of organization that can result from the
process of organizing.
Almost the entire process of organization is accomplished by specifying a
sequence of activities that must be carried out in a particular order. Because of
the repeated situations involved in most organized processes, individuals can
use contingent strategies in which cooperation will have a greater chance of
evolving and surviving. Individuals frequently are willing to forgo immediate
returns in order to gain larger joint benefits when they observe many others
following the same strategy. Changing the positive and negative inducements
associated with particular actions and outcomes and the levels and types of
information available can also encourage coordination of activities.
There are two main theories that provide a framework for achieving
collective action - the theory of the firm and the theory of the state.
2.3.1 The theory of the firm
According to this theory, an entrepreneur recognizes an opportunity to
increase the return that can be achieved when individuals are potentially involved
in an interdependent relationship. The entrepreneur then negotiates a series of
contracts with various participants that specify how they are to act in a
coordinated, rather then independent fashion. Each participant voluntarily
chooses whether or not to join the firm, but gives to the entrepreneur discretion
over some range of choices. The participants become the agents of the
entrepreneur. After paying each of the agents, the entrepreneur retains residual
profits (or absorbs losses). Consequently, the entrepreneur is highly motivated to
organize the activity as efficient as possible. The entrepreneur attempts to craft
contracts with agents that will induce them to act so as to increase the returns to
the entrepreneur, and the entrepreneur monitors the participants.
2.3.2 The theory of the state
In the theory of the state, instead of the entrepreneur we have a ruler who
recognizes that substantial benefits can be obtained by organizing some
activities. If a ruler gains a monopoly on the use of force, the ruler can use
coercion as the fundamental mechanism to organize a diversity of human
activities that will produce collective benefits. The ruler obtains taxes, labor or
other resources from subjects by threatening them with severe sanctions if they
do not provide the resources. Rulers, like entrepreneurs, get to keep the
residuals.
In both the theory of the firm and the theory of the state, the burden of
organizing collective action is undertaken by one individual, whose returns are
directly related to the surplus generated. Both involve an outsider taking primary
responsibility for supplying the needed changes in institutional rules to coordinate
activities. The entrepreneur or the ruler makes credible commitments to punish
anyone who does not follow the rules of the firm or the state. Because they gain
the residuals, it is in their interest to punish nonconformance to their rules if they
are confronted with non-conformance. It is also in their interest to monitor the
actions of agents and subjects to be sure they conform to prior agreements.
Both theories thus address how a new institutional arrangement can come about,
how credible commitments can be made, and why monitoring must be supplied.
Parallel questions have to do with the combinations of variables that will
(1) increase the initial likelihood of self-organization, (2) enhance the capabilities
of individuals to continue self-organized efforts over time, or (3) exceed the
capacity of self-organization to solve CPR problems without external assistance
of some form.
Collective action problems related to the provision of CPRs and
appropriation from CPRs extend over time. Individuals attribute less value to
benefits that they expect to receive in the distant future, and more value to those
expected in the immediate future. In other words, individuals discount future
benefits. Time horizons are affected by whether or not individuals expect that
they or their children will be present to reap these benefits, as well as by
opportunities they may have for more rapid return in other settings. In rural areas
in Romania this becomes a problem because the population is aging and there
are no incentives for them to invest in future benefits. What is more feasible for
their needs are short-term solutions that will provide them with immediate
benefits. It is highly important to create incentives for the young generation to
stay in the villages, so that they can create the base for more sustainable
development policies. Collective action will be enhanced by these incentives.
Policies for improving basic services, like education, health, and infrastructure
are a first step for solving this problem. However, there a significant investment
that needs to be made upfront, which I believe, will result from attracting
entrepreneurial initiatives.
2.4 Policy example for collective action: township-village enterprises,
China
The township-village enterprises (TVEs) are one example of collective
action in the rural setting, following land fragmentation due to land reform. They
are often called "vaguely defined cooperatives," performing extremely well in
practice despite seeming not to be based on well defined property rights. A TVE
is basically a communal organization very far removed from having well defined
property rights (Weitzman and Xu, 1993). According to the official definition,
TVEs are collectively owned enterprises located in townships or villages. More
specifically, all the people in the township or village which "set up" the TVE own
the firm collectively. The property rights of TVEs can only be executed
collectively through the representatives of the community. In practice, the most
common case is that of a community government regarded as the
"representative" of the people in the community, and thus being the de facto
executive owner of the TVEs in the community.
Concerning the management of TVEs, it is typical that the control rights of
TVEs are partly delegated to managers through a contract (officially it is called
the management responsibility contract). In a typical case, employees of a TVE
collectively sign a contract with the executive owner - the community
government. Then, the manager of the TVE is determined jointly by the
community government and the employees. Thus, the manager is a
representative of the employees and of the government. The degree of
community government's role in the appointment of TVE managers varies from
case to case, but it is rarely negligible.
The fast growth and high efficiency of the TVE sector has exerted deep
influences on the state sector in two major aspects. First, the competition has
forced state enterprises to work very hard to avoid making losses. Second,
instead of being replaced by massive privatization (as in most East European
countries' strategies) the relative role of the state enterprises has been gradually
reduced as they outcompeted and outgrown by the TVEs.
As far as the institution of property rights is concerned, the Chinese
experience seems to have contradicted the conventional wisdom. Currently, no
one can claim that the Chinese non-state sector enjoys clearly defined property
rights (Li, 1996). Most of the non-state firms are collectives and other kinds of
non-private firms. The owners of these collective firms are often loosely
specified. Moreover, in all cases, including private firms, the rights of these
owners are ambiguously specified and poorly protected. Most surprisingly, many
econometric analyses reveal that a firm's registered ownership form does not
cause differences in the firm's productive efficiency (Svejnar, 1990, Weitzman
and Xu, 1994).
It would be interesting to analyze this aspect in the case of Romania. As
we will see later in the study, the property rights are not yet clearly defined.
Hence a question that could be answered is whether a collective action such as
TVEs would be likely to emerge within the current institutional structure.
In respect to the Chinese case, one criticism for TVEs is that they were
not subjected to real competition by the government. Huang claims that
domestic private firms were suppressed by the government support for TVEs. In
consequence, TVEs were allowed to compete only with state owned enterprises
that were highly deficient. In consequence, TVEs looked as if they were doing
very well.
In Romania, the following forms of associations can be found operating in
rural areas, according to Law No. 36/1991 (FAO, 2002):
- Family associations - the regrouping of owners coming from two or
more families. They are based on word of mouth, written documents
not being compulsory. Such associations are not judicial entities.
- Agricultural companies - registered in the courts as juridical entities,
comprising of at least 10 landowner partners. The partners remain
owners of their land, which is provided to the associations. The limits
parcels are not marked on the land.
- Commercial companies - legal entities having land registered in their
patrimony for productive purposes.
A next step in the study is to test the theoretical framework against the
case of Romania. Many observers of the contemporary Romanian situation since
1989 agree on the fact that the country has peculiarities setting it apart from
other Central and Eastern European countries. Romania is a large country by
regional standards. It is second to Poland among the former communist
satellites, generously endowed with natural resources, possessing a large stock
of skilled labor and having a reasonably large market potential.
Additionally Romania is a good case study on the topic of land reform,
because the country is transitioning from a totalitarian regime where the concept
of property rights was not applied, to a democratic society that is constructed on
the existence and functioning of property rights institutions. Hence, this would be
the right moment to study how the reform of land redistribution and privatization
contributes to increased productivity and equity. Romania is a developing country
with considerable institutional and physical infrastructure which does provide a
higher starting point (as compared with less developed countries). However, as
we will see later in the paper, in many instances such infrastructure is not
adequate, which makes the transition even more difficult.
Chapter 3 will provide a broad overview of the current conditions, as well
as the role of agricultural sector in the overall economy and the way the
institution of property rights in land functions. Such a background analysis will
help us draw critical conclusions about the role land reform played in the
Romanian economy.
CHAPTER 3
The Romanian Case
3.1 The post-communist reform process in Romania
Romania was the last country in Eastern Europe to brake away from its
post war era, and to start implementing the transition reform programs in 1990s.
Since then, the structure and institutions that were established by the communist
government have been dismantled, in some cases partly and gradually (i.e. land
reform, privatization) and in other cases quickly and hesitantly (i.e. price and
trade liberalization). Inevitably, as in the case of other countries experiencing
transition, the process resulted in social and economic hardships (i.e. surge in
unemployment and poverty rates, sharp decline in production).
The starting point for the transition process in Romania was, in many
respects, more difficult than in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Pre-transition policies had an excessive focus on heavy industry and large
infrastructure projects that most of the time were not economically justified.
Additionally, during the 1980s, the rapid repayment of the US$11 billion foreign
debt (20 to 30 percent of Gross Domestic Product - GDP) imposed severe strains
on the population, with deep cuts in imports and a widening of the technological
gap (WB, 2001). Consequently, towards the end of 1980s the Romanian
economy was on the verge of collapse.
The Romanian reform process begun in January 1990 and the
stabilization program was implemented in mid 1990s. Put together in only few
months, the first program of the Romanian government stated that the two main
objectives -systemic transformation of the economy and of the institutional
structures - were attainable in three years. This statement turned out to be way
too optimistic (to say the least), reflecting an ad-hoc planning process.
Given the difficult communist legacy, and seeking to protect vested
interests and to minimize the social costs associated with the transformation to a
market economy, during the 1990s the Romanian authorities took a gradualist
and piecemeal approach to reform. The imposition of hard budget constraints
and privatization of state-owned enterprises was significantly delayed. While
social concerns were understandable, this strategy failed to produce sustainable
gains in either economic or social realm. Given the experiences of the last 14
years, the costs of a hesitant reform path have been higher than if a bolder
approach to structural transformation had been adopted at the outset. Lack of
political will to reform, and constrained institutional and governance capacity are
at the root of Romania's less-than-satisfactory economic performance and
worsened social conditions.
One of the first reforms undertaken during the transition period was the
land reform (Law 18/1991), which marked the beginning of a whole series of
policies that radically changed the socio-economic structure of the society.
Based on the current outcomes, one could claim that land reform in Romania is a
never-ending story since this represents the fourth phase of such reform in
modern history. More importantly, little progress was made in terms of its
implementation; the 1991 land reform resulted in the same pattern of land
redistribution as during 1940s, facing the same problems - low mechanization,
low productivity.
3.2 The place of agricultural sector in the Romanian economy
Prior to the Second World War Romania was a major agricultural producer
in Europe. However, the forced industrialization during communist times has led
to a loss of competitive advantage.
Agriculture is one of the main natural resources, which currently is
underutilized. Two-thirds of Romania's agricultural area is agricultural land. More
than 80 percent of the agricultural land is arable, rich in cernozium, making most
of the Romanian landscape suitable for growing cereals and other temperate-
climate crops. In the plains, most of the land is used to grow maize, wheat,
barley, sunflower and sugar beet. In hilly areas, alongside with maize there are
orchards and vineyards, and in the river valleys vegetables and grown (notably
potatoes, cabbage, and tomatoes). The large cereal sector supports a moderate
livestock sector specializing in hog, poultry, and cattle breeding.
The agricultural sector in Romania contributes to about 12 percent of
GDP, which is a significant share (Figure 1). The theory of development claims
that a developing country should aim to achieve three percent of agriculture in
the economy, this being indicative of an efficient allocation of resources.
Figure 1: Contribution to GDP, by sectors (constant prices, 1985=100)
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Hence, the relatively high share of agriculture to GDP should not be
considered an indicator of developed agriculture. On the contrary, the decreasing
trend of agriculture in GDP that followed after 1994, together with the increasing
trend of agriculture's share in total employment reveal the continuous decline of
labor productivity in agriculture, estimated at 32 percent of national labor
productivity (Popescu, 2001). In addition, the low share of agriculture in capital
investments and in the fixed assets reveals the precarious technical endowment
and the labor-intensive character of production.5
Nevertheless, because of the high share of population dependent on
agriculture (Figure 2), economic progress in the sector is important for jobs,
earnings as well as food production and raw materials for industry.
Figure 2: Population distribution by area
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Source: National Commission of Statistics, Annual Report Romania, 2002 (own calculations)
More than half of the population currently lives in rural areas6, agricultural
earnings (from self-employment or non-paid family farming) being the main
5 The data source is National Commission of Statistics Romania, Statistical Annual
Report 2002.
6 According to the Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2002, urban area includes only
municipalities and towns. Following this definition, rural areas (communes and villages)
is represented by total country area less urban area (municipalities and towns).
According to OECD definition, a local community is considered rural is the population
density is less than 150 inhabitants/km2. Following this threshold, in 2001, 91 percent of
all communities were considered rural, with 46 percent of the total country population
(IAMO, 2004).
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source of income. Moreover, according to IOMA (2004) the estimates of
aggregate rural incomes indicate that there is a high reliance on social security
payments, with over 19.6 percent of rural incomes being derived from this
source.
In addition, food expenditures represent more than half of the household
expenditures (for households of farmers even more than 70 percent), and thus
food prices and domestic food supply are important policy priorities (Table 1).
Not only does an improvement in agricultural production contribute significantly to
the well-being of the population but, for most Eastern European countries,
agricultural products are one of the few realistic export options in a competitive
world market.
Table 1: Total households expenditures
Money expenditure of which for: 68.4 75 83.3 86.9 39.7 42.4 67.9 72.2 60.5 68
Purchasing consumed food and
beverages 22 23.5 25 24.3 12.5 15.2 27.2 28.6 20.2 23.4
Purchasing non-food goods 17 17.1 19.1 19.1 13.8 12.8 15.6 15.6 15.3 15.3
Payment of services 14.3 15.1 16.4 17.1 6.7 5.4 14.6 15.9 13.8 14.3
Purchasing animals, poultry, fodder,
buildings, lands 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.6 1.6 1.6 0.7 0.7 1.7 1.7
Taxes, fees, contributions, dues 6.1 13.3 12.5 21.5 1 1.9 3.7 7.6 2.2 7.6
Equivalent value of agricultural
products/consumption from own
resources 31.6 25 16.7 13.1 60.3 57.6 32.1 27.8 39.5 32
Source: National Commission of Statistics, Annual Report Romania, 2002
Data on rural and urban income comparisons reveal a mean monthly rural
income of some 60.6 Euro, compared with a higher mean urban income of 76.9
Euro per month (Table 2).
Table 2: Monthly households incomes by urban and rural areas in Romania,
2001
d-y' ural 1q EIar a tosr
Urban 217.4 108,5 76.9 110.7
households
Rural households 179.3 89.4 60.6 87.2
Total households 200.4 100.0 69.5 100.0
Source: IAMO (2004, 45)
Despite being poor, there is a significantly worse and more skewed
distribution of incomes in rural areas (as compared to urban areas), with 41.5
percent in the rural households having an income of less than 53.8 Euro per
month. In urban centers, the share of households with this level of income is
15.3 percent (Table 3).
Table 3: Distribution of households by monthly average income in urban and
rural areas in Romania, 2001
Less than 53.8 26.9% 15.3% 41.5%
53.8-115.3 30.6% 29.8% 31.6%
115.3 - 269.0 33.7% 42.6% 22.6%
269.0 - 442.6 6.6% 9.5% 2.9%
More than 442.6 2.2% 2.8% 1.4%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: IAMO (2004, 45)
Agricultural production system in Romania is subsistence based - most of
the agricultural products are for household consumption and the majority of the
rural population is self-employed or unpaid family workers (Table 4).
Table 4: Employment structure by professional status by areas in Romania,
2001
Total employment, 000's 10,697 15,019 1_5,678
Employee 55.8 89.5 25.9
Employer 1.2 2.1 0.5
Self-employed 23.6 6.2 39.1
Unpaid family worker 19.1 2.2 34.0
Member of an agr. Holding or of a co-operative 0.3 0.0 0.5
Source: IAMO, 2004
The transition to commercial based agriculture, western type of production
and distribution, would be highly desirable for increasing the income base in rural
areas. This becomes even more important as the country is preparing to join the
European Union (EU) in 2007. With the increased openness of the economy, the
competitive pressures on the Romanian agricultural sector have also increased.
Because of the large number of peasants, and the drastic measures
applied in the rural areas by the communist elites7, agricultural sector was
regarded as susceptible for social unrest as well as having strong potential for
7 One of these measures was the "systematization of the agriculture," which consisted of
planned agro-industrial centers intended to brake-up the traditional socio-economic
structures of the villages and improve political-ideological managerial control, as well as
to achieve the ultimate equalization of village and city, of industrial worker and peasant
(Van Meurs, 1999). In practice, the so-called second agrarian revolution proclaimed by
1979 turned into an economic and social disaster. In 1988, the Communist Party began
erasing villages that considered uneconomic and transferring peasants to new
apartment buildings in the designated agro-industrial centers. The apartment buildings
not even lacked the most basic sanitary facilities, but also failed to offer peasants the
garden plots they previously used to feed their families. Moreover, in order to sustain the
austerity measures of paying off the foreign debt, Ceausescu took control also over the
private production of the peasants. Hence, rather than improving the quality of rural life,
and enhancing productivity, Ceausescu's campaign aggravated the food situation in the
country and triggered protests and passive resistance.
political support.8 Therefore, the policies implemented immediately after the
revolution tended to be less feasible in economic terms, and mainly socially
equitable in respect to an equal redistribution of the land forcefully taken away by
the Communist Party.
Due to lack of vision and long-term economic planning, the transition
period was accompanied by an explosive increase in poverty. In the year 2000,
the poverty rate has reached 44 percent of the population (according to the
Government White Book). In the rural areas, the share was even higher, 57.4
percent.
Romanian agriculture, like the rest of the candidate countries for the EU
accession, is currently based on the existence of a large number of small farms,
the sum of which exceeds that of the EU Member States (EU-15) by
approximately 30 percent. However, the land that is cultivated is slightly less
than 40 percent of that of EU-15 (IAMO, 2004).
The present socio-economic situation in the agricultural sector is both the
result of poor reform implementation during the 90s, as well as a consequence of
several historical episodes of land reform. Therefore, the following sections will
summarize the main events that shaped previous land reforms.
8 Among the candidate countries, the importance of agriculture in terms of employment
is highest in Romania (one has to keep in mind that due to data collection inadequacies,
these statistics are likely to be underestimated). With the exception of Bucharest, Central
Romania is the region with the lowest share of agricultural employment; nevertheless,
one in three persons is engaged in agriculture there.
3.3 The 1920 land reform9
Due to an increase in the rural population in the nineteenth century, family
plots had become smaller and smaller: by the end of the century, 85 percent of
peasants either had no land at all or had too little to feed their family (Table 5).
Table 5: Number and size of farms in Romania prior to World War I
< 5 hectares 2.9 77.2
5 - 10 hectares 37.1 18.2
10 - 50 hectares 8.8 3.7
50 - 100 hectares 2.1 0.3
> 100 hectares 48.9 0.5
Source: Wim van Meurs (1999, 109-122).
Motivated by the need to prevent the peasants from becoming
communists rather than by an urge to achieve socio-economic advancement,
land reform became imperative even for the first post-war government. The land
reform in 1918-1921 turned out to be the most radical in the region: large
landowners were expropriated (and compensated) and 6 million hectares (i.e.
one third of the arable land) were handed to 1.4 million peasants (who had to
make payments for 25 years) or turned into community controlled pastures and
forests. The amount of expropriations and compensation regulations differed
across regions: they were more radical in Basarabia (the former Russian region)
and Transylvania (the former Austro-Hungarian region), where the estates had
been in the hands of non-Romanians.
9 The section relies on Wim van Meurs, "Land Reform in Romania - A Never-Ending
However, the former sharecroppers - now small landowners - failed to
change agriculture: scattered plots were not consolidated, and investments in
machinery and better farming models were never made.
All in all, the main motives behind the reforms were of a nation-building or
social policy nature, to the detriment of economic rationale: redistribution of the
land was made in order to solve the social problem of a growing land-less rural
over-population by the eviction of the Hungarian rural elite and the creation of a
larger loyal class of Romanian proprietors. This, however, was merely a
temporary and short sighted solution to the peasant question, and did not
encompass a strategy of economic modernization for how an agrarian sector
absorbing 5-10 percent of the workforce could feed the national population and
contribute to the trade balance of the country.
The struggle for political power in the enlarged Romanian state also
played a significant role in the strategy of land reform. Under the circumstances
of universal suffrage, the younger political leaders of the National Liberal and
National Peasant parties needed a class of small proprietors as a constituency.
At the same time, they had to break the political and economic hegemony of the
large landowners united in the Conservative Party. At least in this respect the
reform was successful: the Conservative Party of large landowners lost its
constituency and its political power. Romanian, Russian (from Basarabia), and
Hungarian (from Transylvania) large landowners are known to have protested
against the nationalization of their estates and - even more vehemently - against
the redistribution of land to smallholders and the landless rural population.
Story," South-East Review, p. 109-122, 2/1999
The distribution of small plots of land to the rural population proved to be
only a temporary solution to the peasant question. Without investment in
infrastructure and mechanization, and without a class of middle-sized farming
enterprises, the redistributive land reform may have won the ruling National Party
the support of the rural population, but it failed to address the issue of economic
modernization. This was true then, as well as in 1864 (when the first land reform
was implemented). The land was redistributed to the peasants but without
facilitating access to the means of production, therefore increasing their
dependency either on landlords, or the state.10 The precarious technical
endowment in the agricultural sector, due to the low accumulation and capital
investment, resulted in a stagnation of the average production per hectare during
the next 20 years at about 900-1000 kg/ha of grains.
However, even during the 1920s, regional differences in the agricultural
performance were evident. The most competitive exploitation of agricultural land
was in the western region, Banat, which was highly capital intensive comparing
with Western Europe at that time (France, Italy, etc.).
For comparison, Table 6 illustrates the active capital per hectare in
agriculture in few European countries and in Romania between 1928-1929.
10 Otiman, Ion Paun. "Agricultura Romaniei. La cumpana dintre Secolul XX un secol al
deznadejdii si secolul XXI un secol al sperantei", Agroprint, Timisoara, 2002
Table 6: Active capital in the agricultural sector ($/ha)
Switzerland 7749 9.1
Norway 5446 6.4
Denmark 3248 3.8
Germany 2740 3.2
Czechoslovakia 2700 3.1
Poland 2253 2.6
Austria 1646 1.9
Romania 856 1.0
Source: Otiman (2002).
Hence, it can be argued that the reason for the decline in agricultural
production is the extreme land fragmentation as well as the lack of technical
endowment. Moreover, institutional factors that could regulate the economic,
financial, and fiscal distortions in the system were inexistent.
3.4 Agricultural sector durinq the socialist regime
In 1990, Romania's institutional and organizational heritage in agriculture
was the following; most land regardless of its legal ownership was cultivated
collectively in large-scale collective and state farms that managed thousands of
hectares and employed hundreds of member-workers; the commercial
production from the collective and state sector was supplemented by
subsistence-oriented individual agriculture based on rural household plots of less
than one hectare, creating a distinctly dual agricultural structure; product markets
and input supply channels were largely controlled by state organizations within
an administrative command framework; production targets were set centrally;
and budget constraints to penalize the ones that underperformed, virtually did not
exist (Lerman, 2001).11
As in other Central and Eastern European countries, the communist
takeover in Romania led once again to agricultural restructuring. First, all
landowners over 50 hectares were evicted and their land was distributed to the
landless and crofters in five hectare plots. Only one-quarter of the expropriated
land remained in the hands of the state at this stage. In contrast to the previous
land reforms, the reform law in 1945 involved not only the estates in Moldova and
Valahia, but also this time the middle-size farms in Transylvania. The
consequences for effective production, however, were similar: with only six
percent of farms having more than 10 hectares after redistribution (and the
standard plot having only five hectares), productivity declined dramatically. This
time again, non-economic considerations were paramount: the distribution of the
small plots was intended to win the rural population over to the new communist
leaders while in the medium-term preparing the ground for collectivization as the
five hectares was seldom enough to feed the peasant's family.
Prior to the communist regime, before 1945, Romania had a system of
private property rights in land similar to most Western economies; they were
exclusive, transferable, alienable, and enforceable, and were placed in the
context of overall institutional structure of the society and economy. Communal
property and state property co-existed with the private property. The property
rights in land were guaranteed by constitutional order, institutional arrangement,
" However, I wonder what were the penalties or consequences for a cooperative that in
one year did not reach its predetermined production quota. Discussions with the
and some customary order. Security and transferability of rights were ensured by
the existence of land registration systems and property titling.
In March 1949 the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party
ordered the collectivization of agriculture: the former royal estates, the estates of
the monasteries, and some of the largest noble estates constituted the basis of
the state farms. Thus, the state farms generally had the best land, the best
equipment, and the largest plots. Consequently, agricultural workers on state
farms were in many ways better off than their colleagues on collective farms:
being workers rather than peasants, the employees of state farms did not have
household plots, but only small gardens and they received an income similar to
industrial wages.
The plots of the smallholders were merged into collective farms, peasant
associations and co-operatives, which became the dominant form of agricultural
production within two years. In 1962, the socialist restructuring of Romanian
agriculture was declared complete with more than 80 percent of the agricultural
land transferred to collective and state farms. By 1989, around 28 percent of the
total agricultural land in the country was in the state sector, the collective farms
accounted for around 65 percent while the rest was held in private use, usually
mountain farms and in small personal allotment plots.12
authorities in the field might provide a clearer picture.
12 It is important to mention that there are several reasons why the communist model for
agriculture was considered to be inefficient, some of them being stronger than others. I
could group them in two categories - macro and micro level conditions. The macro
conditions were set by the command economy itself, which insulated the farms from
market signals, imposed central targets as a substitute for consumer preferences, and
allowed farms to function indefinitely under soft budget constraints without proper profit
accountability. The micro level conditions refer to the exceptionally large firm sizes and
Private ownership of land was limited to garden plots and mountain
meadows or other inaccessible regions inappropriate for collective farming. The
garden or family plot was not only a constitutional right, but also a burden: the
plots and the livestock on them had to be thoroughly registered. The duties in
kind to the state were set so high that some peasants were forced to buy
additional products to fulfill them.
Collectivization of ownership gave the authorities the power to reorganize
the agricultural sector entirely.' 3 The communists introduced a more systematic
approach to production. New crops were planted and by means of zoning, the
authorities could ensure that they took advantage of local geography and local
variations in the climate of the country as a whole. A second tendency was the
application of economies of scale on all parts of production, with far greater use
of agricultural machineries and greater domestic manufacture of inputs such as
fertilizers, which had traditionally been imported. Hence, during this time,
industries connected to agricultural production expanded as well (i.e. agricultural
machineries, chemical industry). After the war, the Soviet Union by way of
repatriations from Romania, confiscated many of the German-supplied tractors
and so it was important to develop a domestic capacity for manufacturing
agricultural machinery. Hence, the "Tractorul Brasov" plant became a renowned
collective organization of production (Cartwright, 2001). The excessive size was
reflected not only in large land endowments, but also in the large number of workers
employed (in absolute terms and per hectare of land). In addition, land was locked into
fixed collective use patterns, and land transfers among users could be initiated only by
central authorities (Lerman, 2001). This type of organization generates high transaction
costs, including the cost of monitoring labor and various agency costs associated with
hired management.
exporter of agricultural machineries in the region and beyond. Although the
Romanian tractor plant took a number of years before it was fully operative, its
production increased significantly in the years to follow. In 1938, the number of
tractors in the country was 26,598, whilst in 1989 it had risen to 116,653.
However, the mechanization of the agriculture was not done equally across
different types of institutional arrangements; state farms benefited more as
compared to collective farms.
Fertilizer use, which had been very low in peasant agriculture, increased
significantly, and in 1970s, most fertilizers were supplied by the Romanian
chemical industry itself (Cartwright, 2001).14 All the main inputs needed for
effective farming were controlled by the state. As in so many parts of the
Romanian economy, the relevant state enterprises were organized to service the
large-scale operations. They provided fertilizers and herbicides in bulk,
agricultural machineries were almost entirely in the hands of the machine tractor
stations, and the state purchasing enterprises, such as ROMCEREAL, bought
directly from the farms.
Up until late 1970s, Romanian economic policy was dominated by the
imperative of rapid industrialization. After the war, agricultural workers constituted
about three quarters of the working population, but only in the 1970s did the
industrialization drive begin to absorb surplus rural labor in large quantities.
13 This section draws on A. L. Cartwright "The Return of the Peasant. Land Reform in the
Post-Communist Romania", Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001
14 The total amount of fertilizers used in agricultural production increased from 5,900
tones in 1950 to 1.37 million tones in 1983 (Turnock 1991).
end of World War I when through nationalization and collectivization most of the
land was concentrated in extremely large collective and state owned farms.
3.5 Land reform implementation in the post-communist period16
After December 1989, the Romanian government made efforts to re-
establish a coherent legal and institutional framework for private property rights in
land but the whole process was characterized by instability, incoherence and
unjustified delays. The land reform has involved three distinct processes: de-
collectivization and re-establishment of private property rights in land;
privatization of state owned farms and concession of public land; the creation of
new farming structures, including the restructuring of existing large-scale farms in
line with the new ownership patterns and the principles of a market based
economy.
As a result, land reform dramatically changed the agricultural landscape in
Romania. Private property became predominant due to the application of Land
Law No. 18/199117 to the detriment of public property. Therefore, the former
arrangements for input procurements, output marketing and credit mechanisms
became unsuitable for a numerous and dispersed clientele (Chirca and Tesliuc,
1999).
16 In this section I do not intend to exhaust the overview all the aspects of the land
reform, but to underline the main undertakings that are of interest for this paper. Law No.
18/1991 was the legal instrument based on which land reform was implemented in
Romania.
" The law is known as "Land Law", published in the "Official Gazette" (Monitorul Oficial)
no. 37/1991 and republished in the "Official Gazette" no. 1/1998.
At the outset of transition18 , 411 state farms and 6,000 producer
cooperatives19 exploited almost all of the country's (arable) land resources. The
1991 land reform brought an unprecedented level of fragmentation of the land
ownership, more severe than in 194820 (see Table 7). As a result of the
application of the Law No.18/1991, the average number of parcels per owner is
around 4 to 5, and the average area of a parcel is approximately 3,000 square
meters (FAO, 2002). Because land fragmentation increases transaction costs in
all market channels, both for inputs and outputs, the use of inputs, machinery
services, and credit dropped severely.
Table 7: Land fragmentation in Romania: 1998 and 1948 compared (%)
Under 1 hectare 36 45
1 - 2 hectares 27 24
Over 2 hectares 37 31
Total _ 100 100
Source: Chirca and Tesliuc (1999: 38)
Because of the extensive communist "suppression" and because people
felt silenced and deprived for so long, in the initial phase, land privatization was
rather a spontaneous process - former landowners made justice to themselves
by taking back their land from the producer cooperatives. De facto, producer
cooperatives were dismantled in 1990/91. In 1991, the legislative authorities had
no option but to issue a land law that sanctioned the earlier spontaneous
18 In 1989, the figures are from the Statistical Yearbook 1990, published by the National
Commission of Statistics, Romania.
19 Chirca and Tesliuc (1999).
repossession of the previous landholdings. It was then that producer
cooperatives were dissolved 'de jure.' Concerned with the re-creation of "landed
estates" the legislative placed a 10 hectares limit on the amount of land to be
restituted. Also, landless households that used to work for cooperatives, or other
landless rural inhabitants were granted ownership rights of up 0.5 hectares.
For comparative purposes, table 8 illustrates the average size of all farms
as well as share of small and large farms in total land cultivated by EU candidate
countries. It can be noticed that significant differences exist between them, but
the small, subsistence farms are predominant (with the exception of Czech
Republic), especially in Romania.
Table 8. Average size of all farms as well as share of small and large
farms in total land cultivated by country
Estonia 12 9% 56%
Latvia 12 9% 31%
Lithuania 4 31% 11%
Poland 8 16% 25%
Czech 100 1% 93%
Republic
Slovakia 31 2% 96%
Hungary 4 18% 58%
Slovenia 6 46% 8%
Romania 2 58% 19%
Bulgaria 4 19% 75%
Total 5 27% 38%
Source: IAMO (2004, 13).
20 "After the land reforms in 1948, 36 percent of the agricultural holdings were less than
one hectares in size, 27 percent were between one and two hectares and 37 percent
over two hectares" (Chirca and Tesliuc, 1999).
Apart from land, the production cooperatives had other assets such as
buildings, equipment and livestock that were restituted, when possible, to their
members. Among these, livestock was easily restituted. Some two million cattle
were transferred from cooperatives to peasant households in 1991/92 (Chirca
and Tesliuc, 1999). However, most of the stock was slaughtered in 1992: by the
end of that year, the cattle herd in peasant households was almost back to its
1989 level. Equipment and buildings were, in most instances, auctioned. Some
of the buildings were simply destroyed, and the construction materials distributed
to the members. At the end of 1992, one could only see empty barns or other
deserted buildings of the cooperatives, ghosts of a bygone past.
The following forms of land tenure replaced state cooperatives: a)
commercial companies (accounting for 4,376 farms, using 13 percent of the
agricultural land); b) individual farms/operating farms (4,170,000 farms, using 80
percent of the agricultural land); and c) other forms accounting for 6,494 units,
using 6 percent of the agricultural land (IAMO, 2004).
Although initially conceived as a complete set of laws and regulations to
secure land ownership and tenure (law on land restitution and cadastre, leasing
law, law on land selling and intervention agency) the legal and institutional set up
was rather devious with big gaps of three-four and even more years between
different laws.2 1 Hence, it could be said that again, the Romanian land reform
was focused more on social aspects of rural modernizations and political tactics,
21 Romanian land reform has started in 1991 with the land Law 18/1991. The Land Law
has been amended and extended in 1997, 1999 and 2001. The legislation on land
leasing was approved four years later (1994), and amended in 1998. The law on
rather than on the economic aspects. In this way, land reform failed to address
the problem of how to create preconditions for a modernized and productive
agricultural sector.
The initially declared land policy was not rapidly or easily transformed into
a coherent set of laws and regulations due to strong policy controversies
representing different interests and ideologies. It took more than ten years to
have the complete set of laws and regulations to ensure the transferability of the
private property rights in land.
It is important to note that despite the Front for National Salvation's
(FSN) 22 political dominance and the marginal role played by the peasantry in the
framing of the land reform, the Land Law confers on the village authorities the
right to decide who receives the land, where and how much land they will
receive. By doing this, I believe that the governing party absolved itself of any
accusations of acting in a authoritarian manner, both to the population and to the
international 'audience' (i.e. World Bank, and IMF) who were pushing hard for
decentralization of the economy.
However, in the transition economies, dominated for more than 50 years
by central command, the administrative and managerial knowledge of the local
authorities is minimal, at least in the initial phase of the reform process. In
addition, in the very first years of transition, the legal and bureaucratic system
was still highly concentrated at the central level. Hence, conferring power to the
cadastre and land registration was issued six years later in 1997 and amended in 2001
and the legislation of land market was issued eight years later in 1998.
22 FSN was the governing party at that time, established immediately after the revolution.
villages in administering the land reform from the very first days of the reform
process proves a lack of understanding of the resulting consequences.
In addition, Law 18 created more absentee landowners than any other
land reform in Romania's history. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, 43
percent of those who had property restored to them now live in towns, 39 percent
live in villages but work in towns, leaving only 18 percent who actually own and
work the land themselves. In addition, taking the rural situation of 1949 as the
norm for restitution, ignored the fact that many former landowners had died,
moved to the city or emigrated. The question of how their heirs were to divide the
restitution claim among themselves, was not regulated and generated conflicts
between family members. According to OECD, disputes related to the
implementation of Law 18 generated about one million court cases.
Given that there were more than six million new landowners, it would be
natural to expect that there would be a vast amount of land transactions (buying
and selling). However, as Cartwright (2001) mentions, the development of a state
regulated land market was severely impaired by both legal restrictions and
bureaucratic incapacity. Many owners did not receive their legal documents until
years after the original settlement, having to get by in the meantime with a
temporary 'statement' issued by the local mayor. In addition, the possession of
the ownership certificates is also important as collateral in applying for loans to
cover outlays on seeds, fertilizers, and machinery.
23 "Adevarul", 2 3rd April 1993. According to information from the UK agricultural
consultancy firm MASDAR, 60% of landowners no longer live in the rural areas.
"Information Pack for Farming in Romania". Wokingham. December 1997.
Overall, the fundamental objectives of Law 18/1991 appeared divided
between the need to compensate for wrongs committed under communism
through the authoritarian rule of the state, and the need to establish the property
basis for a modern rural economy. Hence, it is rather tempting to conclude that
the difficulties that many private farmers have experienced since 1991 have been
in large measure the result of this indecision.
3.6 The performance of the agricultural sector
The transition reform program implemented in the 1990s had significantly
changed the structure of the economy and its degree of openness. The 1997
"shock therapy" program had important consequences for the import regime,
including that of agricultural products. The government of Romania implemented
a comprehensive agricultural policy reform, supported by World Bank Agricultural
Sector Adjustment Loan (ASAL), which reversed the protective trend of
Romanian agricultural trade policy towards trade liberalization.
Between 1991 and 2001, agriculture was the only sector in the economy,
which showed an increase in labor productivity. At the first glance, once can
claim that agriculture is highly efficient (less number of employees now produce
relatively higher output). This result can also reinforce Schumpeter's view - a
continuous decline in output (recession) accompanied with persisting high
unemployment (depression) will render a sufficient condition to enhance the
efficiency of labor productivity in an economy (Tobin, 1983: 34). The core of
Schumpeter's assertion is based on the idea that when production units in an
economy (say farms) fear for their own existence they do not keep excess
workers. Instead, they encourage managers and production workers alike to
increase efficiency - lower employment (minimize cost) and raise production. In
this view, labor productivity is mostly perceived through the eyes of the producer
and considers the individual merely as a factor of production, a worker.
Nevertheless, the above outcome - the higher labor productivity in the
agricultural sector - can simply be due to the higher decline in the number of
employees in the agricultural sector relative to the real agricultural output. This
trend can be easily explained by the gradual privatization of agriculture
(dismantling of the collective farms) and hence a reduction in "formal"
employment. The people who worked previously on the collective farms are still
working, but now they have their own family plots, and hence they are
considered self-employed, but with no formal contract (simple farmers). It would
be simply incomplete to claim that, there was an increase in labor productivity
(and hence higher efficiency in the agricultural sector) since the excessive land
fragmentation impeded mechanization, and relied heavily on the subsistence
system of production.
The reduction in output accompanied by an increase in unemployment is
considered by many economists as a sufficient condition for a sign of robust
economic growth. As Keynes pointed out, during an economic recession,
nominal wages and prices do not adjust quickly to maintain the classical
equilibrium. In fact, in Romania, the general price level has increased. 4 In this
respect, the conventional approach claims that such a condition will eventually
lead to the expansion of output in the long run - producers have a window of
opportunity to increase profits (lower wages accompanied by persistent inflation
will provide ample opportunities to sell less by costly) and after some time these
producers reinvest what they have gained through the macro-circular flow
mechanism. In conclusion, they claim that in the long-run employment and output
will increase and real income will eventually improve. The experience of Romania
has so far disputed this claim.
A first look at Figure 3 illustrates that between 1985 and 1989 the
contribution of agriculture to GDP was relatively stable. However, in 1990 a sharp
increase is unprecedented but can be explained by two factors. First, the overall
level of GDP declined, while the agricultural output increased or stayed the same
between 1989-90. These two factors continued to influence the trend in the
following years.
24 During the transition period, an extreme uncertainty and large price increases are
prevalent. Therefore, producers will attempt to protect themselves from the risk of losses
attached to an underestimation of future inflation. They will do this by raising prices
initially at a higher rate than they expected the rate of inflation.
Figure 3: Contribution of the agricultural real output to real GDP
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Source: National Bank of Romania, Annual Report 2002 (own calculations)
However, in order to get a better understanding of agriculture's
performance during the period of 1989-2002, we should divide the time interval
into two time spans, pre and post 1989 (Table 9). It can be noticed that the
contribution of agriculture to GDP (in real terms) is actually negative after 1989.
Still, the share of agriculture in GDP remains significantly high, indicating a
strong resistance to change and a slow adjustment to market mechanisms.
Table 9: Real agricultural output, real GDP, and contribution of
agriculture to real GDP (percentage rage of change)
1985-1988 1989-2002
Real agricultural output
average %rch -0.6 -3.8
Real GDP
average %rch -0.8 -0.8
Contribution of agriculture to real GDP
average %rch 0.04 -1.3
Source: National Bank of Romania, 2002 (own calculations)
Additionally, while the labor productivity enhanced, on average, the real
wage level declined. In real terms this is the sector with the sharpest decline in
earned income (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Real wages by sectors
Real Wages by sectors, in 1990
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Source: National Commission of Statistics, Annual Report Romania, 2002 (own calculations)
Hence, ironically agriculture is the sector with the highest productivity and
lowest incomes (and as noted earlier, the highest poverty rate). So maybe
agriculture does indeed create surplus, which is drained out to other sectors, like
industry. If this would be the case, according to the economic theory, we should
be able to observe an outward migration from rural areas to urban areas,
increase in exports of agricultural products, and industrial expansion. However,
the reverse is true - we can notice an increase in the in-migration in the rural
areas despite the high poverty rate (Table10), the exports of agricultural products
are very low, the imports increasing much faster, and there are no significant
improvements in industry.
Table 10. Structure of urban and rural internal migration flows due to permanent
residence change (rates per 1000 inhabitants).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
From rural to urban 1 10.71 9.41 6.91 6.61 5.9 5.9 5.6 4.9 4.7 3.9
From urban to rural 2.5 3.8 3.4 4.7 5.8 6.7 7.9 7.7 8.3 8.1
Source: Maniu et al.(2002).
During the second half of the transition decade rural areas acted as an
absorber of the excess industrial labor force and thus serving as a buffer in
synchronizing the unbalanced speed of the declining industry versus the
increasing service sector.
3.7 What went wrong?
The current state of agriculture indicates that the implementation of the
land reform in 1991 was deficient. The brief historical review of land reform
demonstrated that the policymakers did not learn from the past in any of these
"episodes." The same mistakes were made in the 1990s as in 1918-1920 and
thereafter. Agriculture was erroneously considered a political instrument for
"silencing" the largest social group, the rural population. There was no effort for
building a long-term viable agriculture, for modernizing and enhancing its
capacity for profit making. From the very beginning, agriculture was not
considered an important sector from economic, financial, and social point of view.
This is the only way that one can explain why the most viable farms (ranging
between 10-50 hectares) came to the policymakers' interest only in 1999.
The following sections will discuss in greater detail the main problems that
agriculture was facing after the implementation of land reform.
3.7.1 Excessive land fragmentation
Privatization of land resulted in Romania in breaking down the large
collective farms (land fragmentation) and redistribution to the initial owners
(before collectivization). The 'evils' of fragmentation 5 need no emphasis: waste
of time and effort, and the impossibility of rational cultivation are obvious effects.
Nonetheless, nobody can claim that consolidation of holdings is an easy reform
to implement. The conservatism of the peasant is one obstacle, the inadequate
institutional structure to carry out the process is another one, as well as the high
cost per acre of surveying and exchanging many plots. To carry out the process
of land consolidation in a successful way, it would need to be accompanied by
general programs of agricultural and social development (ex. credit access,
education).
25 "Fragmentation has several causes. It originated in remote times from the traditional
land layout, in which holdings were divided into several strips located in different parts of
a village. In the course of time, these original strips have been divided and subdivided,
The new class of farmers, lacking modern agricultural knowledge and
facing severe cost disadvantages due to their small-scale operations, switched
their production mix away from modern toward traditional crops and reduced their
market transactions to a minimum in favor of an autarchic production system.
3.7.2 Orqanizational history
The agricultural sector in Romania has literally no organizational history.
Besides the collective farms coordinated by the central authority, there were no
other forms of collective action or trace of entrepreneurial initiatives.
Consequently, the transition to private property and individual land holdings was
rather shocking for the existing institutional structure. Additionally, the lack of
vision in planning and insufficient time to learn from the experiences of other
countries, led to a chaotic institutional organization.
Nevertheless, still due to the tight communist rule, any sort of collective
action was dismissed regardless of its economic rationale. Anecdotal evidence
shows that even the EU program called CAP (Common Agricultural Policy),
aimed at promoting sustainable organizations framework for rural development,
was received with suspicion and reluctance in most of the areas because the
acronyms were the same as for the communist collective farms - in Romanian,
Cooperative Agricole de Productie (CAP).
as a result of the increase in farm population, and of inheritance laws which encourage
the subdivision of land among the heirs." United Nations (1951)
3.7.3 Land markets
The land market (an essential institution for land consolidation and
creating a market-based agriculture) is not fully developed in Romania, largely
due to the not yet completed land privatization. A significant drawback was the
long delay in adopting the law for leasing and selling land, until 1998.
Additionally, Law 54/1998 regarding the legal movement of land does not favor
the development of the land market. Until 1998, informal family associations were
the only land-pooling option for joint operation. This kind of association
developed spontaneously in the wake of de-collectivization as a reaction to the
mismatch between coordinated household access to land, labor, and capital.
The National Agency for Rural Development designated by Land Law
18/1991 to purchase land from new owners to use it for public purposes creating
larger holdings through consolidation, was never established. Hence, the poor
development of the land market delayed the process of agricultural development.
It should also be emphasized that statistics on land lease are very poor,
almost nonexistent. Land prices in Romania are much lower as compared to
other countries in the region; a price of 230-270 Euro/ha in the countryside and
2,100-2,300 Euro/ha within communities is common in Romania, whereas prices
in Slovenia reach up to 25,000 Euro/ha (IARO, 2004). Land prices have impact
on the structural development of agriculture. High prices positively influence
access to credits, since land-owners have more collateral. Additionally, since
land is the main asset for most of the rural families in Romania, an increase in
price would make it worthwhile for selling, and hence for land consolidation.26
However, high prices also translate to a more expensive land consolidation
process.
Nevertheless, the right to acquire arable land of up to 200 ha and the
decrease in land prices are not conducive to creating an active land market.
Additionally, land transactions are also limited by the high cost of notary fees and
fiscal taxes, which are levied in addition to Cadastral and Agricultural Register
taxes. Land leasing would be a way of increasing the size of farm holdings, but
renting agricultural land is not yet popular in Romania. In the present
circumstances, farmers would have to resist the difficulties of financing
production and investments, as well as high taxes.
3.7.4 Property rights
The weak and almost nonexistent institutional structure had an extremely
detrimental effect on the agricultural sustainability. Even to this date the
redistribution of the property titles is not entirely finalized. This outcome is mostly
due to administrative inefficiencies, which could be remedied by legislative
actions. There are still landowners who did not receive the land title yet, or who
are still struggling in land disputes.
26 From talking to peasants in the rural areas, I learned that even if it is impossible to
work the land (due to unavailability of capital), many households are reluctant to sell the
small plots of land because the price is very low, and they are waiting for the time when
land will be prices higher. For the majority, land is the only source of income in the rural
areas.
3.7.5 Access to credit
Romania is the only country among the candidates to EU rated as having
strongly inadequate financial services. Hence, not surprisingly, another
institutional impediment is the poor availability of credit for farmers. The banking
system is adjusted to meet the credit needs of large industrial and commercial
enterprises, and of agricultural production as far as it is organized in large
estates. However, in Romania, the greater part of agricultural production is in the
hands of individuals or families conducting small enterprises/farms with very
limited capital. The long production period in agriculture also tends to eliminate
the ordinary commercial banks as direct sources of credit to farmers.
Consequently, the financing of small-scale agricultural production requires the
provision of credit through special agencies. Shortage of credit may be a cause
for subsistence agriculture - the lack of ready money in the hands of the farmer
prevents investment in the farm. The organization of cooperatives for the
improvement of marketing and for the provision of credit facilities forms the
essential framework which small-scale farming needs, if it is to bring about better
living standards and better methods of farming.
3.7.6 Prices for aqricultural products
The uncoordinated price liberalization of the inputs and outputs related to
agricultural production created serious distortions in the sector performance.
There is a significant difference between the increase in prices for inputs in
27 According to IOMA report, by the Country experts of the Network of Independent
Agricultural Experts in the CEE Candidate Countries.
agriculture (i.e. raw materials, energy and services, machinery, materials) and
the increase in prices for agricultural outputs (raw materials for industry, food
products, intermediate agricultural products). Hence, besides the difficult access
to market, it became harder for the farmers to recoup even the production cost.
Additionally, analyzing the price indices, one can notice that the weak technical
and economic performance of the industrial sector was transferred to agriculture,
and ultimately to the consumers (Otiman, 2002). Overall, the prices of the
industrial products used in agriculture increased more than 1,100 times between
1991-1998, while the prices of agricultural products increased only 450 times
over the same time interval (Table 11).
Table 11. Price indices for industrial and agricultural products (1990=1)
-4
Tractors 12.5 21.3 62.2 114.5 170.9 428.4 881.6 1120.0
Agricultural machineries 14.4 24.5 41.0 88.9 137.8 275.7 731.9 1055.2
Chemical fertilizers 18.5 18.5 51.1 144.7 187.2 174.5 335.3 961.8
Energy 18.5 33.1 64.7 153.3 190.2 399.5 969.3 1120.6
Total industrial products 17.0 27.6 65.3 134.3 185.4 301.1 742.1 1105.3
Vegetal products 8.5 19.1 48.0 98.0 133.8 211.9 418.2 531.4
Animal products 5.1 10.8 41.8 98.8 120.9 184.9 342.2 395.3
Total agricultural products 6.4 14.0 44.2 98.4 125.9 195.4 371.6 448.0
Source: Otiman (2002:248)
3.7.7 Access to technological capital
While land and labor are abundantly available in agriculture in Romania
(as well as in other CEE countries), capital is not. Most of the peasants had no
means whatsoever to undertake farm work. According to World Bank survey in
1991, only 9 percent had anything resembling a tractor, 28 percent had either a
horse or a buffalo, and only 12 percent had a plow. The time of the land
takeovers was dead winter and early spring -time to prepare the fields. But which
peasant would have had seeds to plant?
Another reason for the slow development of the agricultural supportive
services (technology, seeds, etc.) was the sluggish restructuring of the respective
industries, which remained under the administration of the state. In my opinion
this would represent a problem as long as the system is designed for the new
market oriented institutional structure, based on property rights and
small/medium entrepreneurs. However, the managerial system for the
enterprises providing agricultural inputs and processing the outputs was still
working on the premises of large farms and owners.
3.7.8 Human capital
The availability of human capital with adequate skills in rural areas
constitutes another problem for agriculture to contribute to economic
development. The age of the rural population, as well as limited access to
education (especially vocational training) and health are major impediments to
the long-term success of land reform.
The formal educational qualifications of the rural population in Romania
are lower as compared to the national average. The percentage of the low
educational level in the active rural population is 1.8 times higher than the
respective share in the total population (IAMO, 2004: 63).
Table 12: Rural education level by age groups in Romania, 2001 (%)
Rural total 100 100 100 100 100
Higher education 0.7 2.5 3.0 2.4 0.3
Post high school and foreman 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.1 0.4
education
High school (XI-XIII classes) 19.8 43.3 25.8 4.9 1.2
Vocational and apprenticeship 24.4 29.7 31.2 12.6 2.3
education I II
VIII-X classes high school 45.4 20.0 31.8 42.6 28.6
Primary or less education 8.5 2.9 6.2 35.4 67.2
Source: IAMO (2004, 64).
Agricultural education and graduates at all levels hold a very low share in
the Romanian educational system. In the past years, this trend is even more
pronounced as the overall budget for education deteriorated, there is very little
investment in the agricultural sector, and the future job prospects in this sector
are very discouraging.
In general, the quality of rural education is reported to be lower than in
towns due to difficulties attracting the best teachers, worse school equipment,
less access to information technology, few special schools and finally, financing
problems.
Because of all these obstacles presented in this chapter, agro-food
production, while having a great potential for growth, is tragically low and so far
has not succeeded to conform to the qualitative standards of the EU market.
Taking as an example the dairy industry, in 2001 only 15 percent of the milk
production was delivered to dairy plants (the lowest in Europe), a decline as
compared to the previous years. Romania has the highest number of dairy
plants, employing the highest number of employees as compared to other
candidate countries, but they collect the lowest amount of revenues (IAMO,
p.116). The main reasons for enterprises not being able to comply with EU-
standards are sanitary, veterinary rules, hygiene, and mainly quality of the
products. As a result, 20 percent of enterprises will have to close down because
of not being able to comply with EU standards. Moreover, 25 percent of agro-
food enterprises will have to close down because of not being able to withstand
EU competition.
CHAPTER 4
Lessons to learn
Land reform is one of the first policies implemented by countries with large
agricultural resources, striving for development. Hence, this is not a new
phenomenon and therefore it is possible to learn from other experiences and
contexts for finding the right mix of policies.
Several countries in East Asia (such as Taiwan) considered land reform
as the first step for laying out the foundation for development. In these countries
land reform and the accompanying agricultural policies transformed the
subsistence agriculture into surplus-generating commercial farming. This surplus
enhanced the creation of a middle class of rural entrepreneurs who invested part
of the profits in industries. Developing the links between input and output
channels in the agricultural sector was highly beneficial for the sustainability of
the agricultural sector as well as for future industrialization.
Even if the history of these regions (East Asia and Eastern Europe) are
very different we can still find institutional similarities and we can draw lessons
from them as far as the policymaking and vision attributed to the agricultural
sector is concerned.
In general, in East Asia land reform entailed the transfer of rights to
tenants without breaking-up operational holdings, focused on agricultural
research (e.g. higher-yielding crop varieties), increased application of chemical
fertilizers, and a range of other activities and institutions that supported the
above. Moreover, the parallel development of agriculture and industry was key
for the country's sustained growth.
The accomplishments in Japan and Taiwan were the outgrowth of firm
determination, adequate laws, and enforcement. Enforcement was made
possible by assigning the task to agencies at different levels of government,
including local land commissions of elected representatives of tenants, owners,
and landlords with the duty if enforcing the program locally (Lin, 1975).
This process required a significant number of administrative trained staff.
For instance, in Japan, a total of 400,000 persons at all government levels were
required to purchase and transfer nearly two million hectares of cultivates land
and make over four million lease contracts. Of the total personnel, 90 percent
were required at the local level.
One characteristic of the land reform in China and North Vietnam is that
the process was dependent on the genuine participation of the peasants in a way
that was true of most land-reform programs in non-Communist countries, which
begin and end with the transfer of land ownership (Moise, 1983).
The historic context is very different as compared to Romania since the
main land reform carried out in 1940s started by the communist regime
redistributing land to the peasants away from landlords, and later on taking it
away into collective farms. Land reform in China, with the logo "land to the tiller",
has contributed to sustainable economic growth due to the focus of the party on
empowering the peasants for investing in land and engaging them in profit
generating activities.
In the following section I will summarize briefly the main policy approaches
adopted by East Asian countries for land reform. I will focus mainly on Taiwan, its
government being the most determined to incorporate land reform in the
economic development plans. I will continue with China, Vietman, and briefly
Korea, where the most significant aspect of the policy was the focus on land use
rights rather than land privatization (and hence redistribution).
4.1. Land Reform in Taiwan28
First of all, as opposed to the Romanian case, clarity of policy objectives
was a central goal of on agricultural change in Taiwan. The focus was clearly and
unmistakably on efficiency as the standard against which to judge program
success. Moreover, Taiwan's hard-nosed focus on increasing farmer income has
been in marked contrast to that of Romania.
A second goal has been the creation of a flexible agriculture that could
respond quickly to export demands. Third, the agricultural sector was designed
as a resource-supplying sector. Agriculture was provided with labor-intensive
technology and modern inputs while at the same time being squeezed heavily in
net resource terms. Few countries have done both so skillfully. In most cases the
28 In this section I will draw mainly from Falcon (1974) and Amsden (1985).
tendency has been to concentrate on the latter and ignore the former, with
serious negative consequences for the economy as a whole.
However, the most important aspect of the land reform in Taiwan is the
role played by the government - land reform was implemented, supervised, and
supported heavily by the state. The state provided affordable loans, and
agricultural inputs to the farmers. In 1965, government agencies or related credit
institutions supplied 65 percent of all agricultural loans. Additionally, the state
monopoly on fertilizers was perhaps the most important element both in
stimulating production and in extracting the surplus from agriculture.
One other aspect that contributed to a successful land reform in Taiwan
was the accurate land tenure data, which were non-existent in Romania. This
reduced the time spent on land reallocation, as well as the conflicts over land.
Additionally, it diminished and kept under control informal land transfers and
created the framework for a functional land market.
Agriculture, in the case of Taiwan, was indeed a major resource
contributor, but two other circumstances helped to make this role possible. First,
the popular sentiment about agriculture was not a prerequisite for the
government to remain in power (as it can be said about the Romanian case).
Second, even though the sector was squeezed quite hard, agriculture was given
a number of critical ingredients - improved health, and education facilities,
improved rural communication, and modern technology - having an important
impact on increasing productivity.
Overall, it becomes clear that in Taiwan, state action was the key to
increasing agricultural output and to financing the growth of other services.
Hence, fast growth and a transfer of agricultural resources to towns was not the
outcome of free market forces and free trade, but it reflected the structure of
ownership in the countryside and state management of almost every conceivable
economic activity. However, the state was not supporting agriculture in a
controlling manner. An important aspect of the strategy was the ingenious
blending of public and private sector activities. The public sector acted mainly as
planner and as a supplier and coordinator of key public goods. This has been
coupled with extraordinary entrepreneurial capacity of the private sector to
produce a partnership in which each side did what it could do best.
The division of planning activity between public and private sectors also
evokes comment. The way centralized targets were formulated, discussed in
terms of efficiency and consistency at all levels of government, and then iterated
up and down the various levels of government contributed a lot to the successful
implementation of the reform.
Moreover, the state invested heavily in building an institutional structure
for technological up-grade in agriculture. A number of institutional innovations
had an important bearing on agricultural development in Taiwan. The Farmer
Associations were central in supplying modern inputs and credits, in providing
marketing facilities, and in receiving and supplying relevant information for
planning. These agricultural associations provided peasants with extension
education, the cooperative purchase of fertilizers, warehousing, and other
services. They had broad-based support and were seen by the government as
full partners in agricultural development. Additionally, the state supported the
establishment of research agencies for enhancing agricultural production. In this
way, the state set in motion the application of science to farming, which
characterizes the rural economy of Taiwan today. Furthermore, raising of the
educational level of the farmers has also brought about changes for those who
chose to remain on the farms. For one thing, education makes them more
receptive to new technology (e.g., the use of mechanical agricultural
implements).
Fast growth and the transfer of agricultural resources to non-agricultural
sectors and to urban areas, were neither the outcome of free market forces, nor
the automatic result of purely technical phenomena - the green revolution.
Rather, they reflected the structure of ownership in the countryside and state
management of almost every conceivable economic activity. Additionally, the
state monopoly on fertilizers was perhaps the most important element both in
stimulating production and in extracting the surplus from agriculture.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
In 1934 the English historian R.W. Seton-Watson wrote that "two
generations of peace and clean government might make of Romania an earthly
paradise" (Seton-Watson, 1934). Unfortunately, neither peace nor clean
government followed.
Moreover, at the beginning of the reform process, the Romanian Ministry
of Agriculture rightly stressed that Romania could become self-sufficient in
almost all its food requirements. He claimed that the soil quality and the amount
of agricultural land can produce yields sufficient to feed twice the present
population. However, after more than 13 years of reform, even the hopes that
this will happen disappeared and Romania became a major importer of grains
and food products.
Land reform is a major policy for any country endowed with agricultural
land, where the majority of population is located in rural areas, farming being the
main source of income. Additionally, land reform is a step-stone for successful
industrialization in these countries. The surplus generated from agricultural
development is the key resource for advancing growth in the industrial sector.
Securing higher standards of living in rural areas, rather than using agricultural
sector as a social buffer, ensures a uniform growth across the economy.
Barnejee (2001) claims that a successful land reform might start a country on
what has been called a vicious cycle of poverty reduction: by making the farmer
the tenant of the land, labor productivity is enhanced and hence income
increases. A higher income allows the farmer to save and to invest more, raising
his income even further, and so on.
A general implication of the land reform is that land redistribution comes
with a multiplier effect that makes productivity much larger than other aspects
influenced by reform. Moreover, in time, successful land reform can take other
burdens away from the government, such as investment in health, education, or
infrastructure.
However, I do believe that in the initial phase of the reform, the role of the
government is crucial for lunching development. For example, it may be easier to
subsidize the accumulation of assets by poor people than to actually transfer
assets to them. Subsidization can be accomplished by paying farmers higher
than market returns on their products (or bank deposits) or by using public
money to improve access to financial institutions.
In Romania, as is other Central and Eastern European countries, land
reform was regarded as a symbol for breaking away from the communist system.
The reform consisted of restituting land to the former owners and distributing land
without payment to agricultural workers in the interest of social equity. Hence,
land reform was mostly a political decision, and not necessarily a decision driven
by rational economic considerations. Not surprisingly, its long-term economic
outcomes are deceptive. Backwardness rather than modernization can best
describe today the agricultural sector in Romania. Poverty, unemployment, and
youth out-migration are reflections of the social environment. Moreover,
agricultural production is subsistence based, having no access to market
channels domestically or internationally.
Whether a country adopts restitution to former owners or distribution to
agricultural workers, the major determinants of a successful land reform remain
the allocation strategy (plots or paper shares), the legal status of private
ownership, and the transferability or tradability of use rights and property rights
(Lerman, 2001). The Romanian reform was deficient in all these key strategic
areas.
Conventional economists argue that the path to economic growth for
developing countries is to shift the allocation of resources from agriculture to
industry, and then to services. However, one cannot jump over any of these
stages. For instance, what Taiwan's government understood, and Romania's did
not, is that in order to make the transition from an agricultural-based economy to
industrialization, the most important task is to create agricultural surplus. In
contrast, the Romanian government decided to use the agricultural sector as a
social safety net during the industrial restructuring. Such a policy prevented the
economy from extracting agricultural surplus, and at the same time, missed the
importance of the institutional structure that otherwise would have been created.
Hence, planning strategically and applying incentives for increase in
productivity can make land reform much more likely to succeed. Institutions for
property rights in land are crucial for development, but they are not sufficient. I
believe that adopting empowerment strategies is more important. Specifically, I
argue that it is more effective to have the property title over a plot of land, and to
lease the right to use the land to some other entity established as a collective
organization. In this way the problem of excessive land fragmentation would be
resolved, access to credit would be improved, and due to scale economies
productivity will be enhanced.
One of the key problems with land reform in Romania was the fact that
Law 18/1991 did not only distribute land to the villagers but it attempted to re-
create the property regime that existed before collectivization.29 Such an
undertaking was problematic mainly because it created a lot of absentee
landowners with no skills, interest, or resources to invest in agriculture.
Therefore, in the absence of adequate land markets that would make possible
the transfer of land from, lots of agricultural resources remained underexploited.
Another major cause for the failure of land reform in Romania is the
minimum role played by the state in supplying means to acquire raw materials
(i.e. fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, etc.), investing in modern technology, as well as
offering affordable loans, and support the creation of an institutional framework in
which agricultural sector can increase productivity and generate surplus.
One could argue that land reform illustrates that the government in
Romania selected 'off the shelf' reforms derived from one set of assumptions at
the same time they selected other reforms based upon quite different, or even
29 Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic adopted the same approach, while
Albania, Russia, and Armenia relied only on distributing the land without trying to
recreate the pre-communist land ownership structure.
directly contradictory premises. Nevertheless, Romania combined historical
justice with equity, while efficiency considerations played a less important role.
Therefore, integrating land issues into the broader development agenda of
the government becomes a key requirement for sustainable development. The
problem is not one of dividing the land so that everyone can have a piece.
Rather, it is one of creating alternatives for developing new forms of employment.
In this way society becomes dynamic and all people benefit by sharing increases
in income and social benefits.
For land reform to contribute to: increasing output and productivity;
generating savings and capital formation; increasing potential employment in
agriculture; and promoting greater demand for consumer goods and services as
well as acquisition of production inputs among the beneficiaries, it should not be
limited to the distribution of property rights in land. In order to contribute to the
process of economic development, land reform planning should include the
synchronization of land redistribution with the provision of credit, marketing
services, and development of managerial abilities of the new owners. The timing
of building investment requirements and market orientation into the land reform is
crucial in the achievement of its economic results.
Moreover, planning land reform is one thing, and achieving its objectives
is another. As land reform ends most of the time as being basically politically
charged, the political will and determination of the government for its rapid and
complete implementation without using the law only for emotional political
purposes (as was the case in Romania), is essential.
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